United Nations S/2011/588

Security Council

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19 September 2011

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Letter dated 19 September 2011 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 16 September 2011 (S/2011/587) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Ian Martin (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) as your Special Representative and Head of UNSMIL and Mr. Georg Charpentier (Finland) as your Deputy Special Representative and Resident Coordinator ad interim has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2011/589

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Distr.: General
20 September 2011

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Letter dated 20 September 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I would like to bring to your attention a matter of great concern regarding the acute shortage of military helicopters in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

MONUSCO currently has only 14 military helicopters, comprising 10 utility helicopters and 4 observation helicopters. The Mission is facing a shortfall of six military utility helicopters. The Mission has no attack helicopters at this time.

MONUSCO military helicopter assets are deployed exclusively in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, namely in the Kivus and Province Orientale. Of the Mission's 10 military utility helicopters, 6 are deployed in Province Orientale in support of military operations to address the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army, whose murderous attacks against civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have once again been on the rise, as well as remnant Ituri militia. The remaining four military utility helicopters are deployed in the Kivus; two of these are light helicopters with reduced capacity.

The impact of the shortage of military helicopters on the implementation of the MONUSCO mandate has become critical. Joint operations with the Congolese Armed Forces have had to be postponed, investigations of allegations of mass human rights violations have had to be delayed, and some deployments to protection hot-spots have had to be deferred. Getting essential supplies to United Nations troops in far-flung, volatile areas has also been extremely difficult. This is made all the more critical in the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 28 November 2011.

The Secretariat has vigorously pursued contacts with troop-contributing countries over the past year regarding the provision of military helicopters. As a result, South Africa has pledged to provide MONUSCO with an additional military utility helicopter.

The Secretariat is also closely involved with the Security Council members and other Member States to address the root causes of this critical capability gap across United Nations peacekeeping operations, thinking "outside the box" for new and innovative solutions. I have personally led several of these initiatives, and we have been actively supported in these efforts by a number of Member States.

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However, we do not foresee a deployment of additional military helicopter assets to MONUSCO, beyond the pledge by South Africa, before the end of this year.

Critical capability gaps within United Nations peacekeeping operations are unfortunately not confined to MONUSCO. However, the current lack of military helicopters in MONUSCO has become acute, and it is my duty to inform you that the Mission is no longer able to carry out critical parts of its priority mandated tasks, including in relation to the protection of civilians, providing support to the elections and putting an end to the presence of armed groups, particularly in the Kivus.

I am concerned that if this situation is not addressed by the Security Council, the largest United Nations peacekeeping operation will be at risk of failure, with serious consequences for lives and livelihoods for the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The credibility of the Council and of the United Nations is also at risk.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations A/66/369–S/2011/590

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 38
The situation in Afghanistan

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/8 and Security Council resolution 1974 (2011), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on developments in Afghanistan every three months.

2. The report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including significant humanitarian, development and human rights efforts, since the previous report (A/65/873-S/2011/381), dated 23 June 2011. The report also provides a summary of key political and security developments and information on regional and international events related to Afghanistan.

II. Summary of key political and security developments

A. Security situation

3. There were fewer security incidents in July (2,605) and August (2,306) than in June (2,626). As at the end of August, the average monthly number of incidents for 2011 was 2,108, up 39 per cent compared with the same period in 2010. Armed clashes and improvised explosive devices continued to constitute the majority of incidents. The south and south-east of the country, particularly around the city of Kandahar, continued to be the focus of military activity and accounted for approximately two thirds of total security incidents.

4. There were 9 suicide attacks in July, the third successive monthly decrease from a peak of 17 in April. There were 11 suicide attacks in August. As at the end of August, the average monthly number of suicide attacks for 2011 was 12, a level that was unchanged compared with the same period in 2010. Complex suicide attacks

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made up a greater proportion of the total number of suicide attacks. On average, three such attacks have been carried out per month in 2011, a 50 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2010. Insurgents continued to launch complex suicide attacks in urban centres, including the attacks on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on 28 June, on the British Council in Kabul on 19 August, in the vicinity of the United States Embassy in Kabul on 13 September and on provincial centres, such as the one on Tirin Kot, Uruzgan Province, on 28 July. The focus of suicide attacks was no longer southern Afghanistan, the central region currently accounting for 21 per cent of such attacks.

5. As in the previous reporting period, insurgents continued to conduct a campaign of intimidation, including through the targeted assassination of high-ranking Government officials, members of the security forces and influential local political and religious leaders. There were 54 incidents in July and 72 in August, killing 89 and 93 individuals, respectively. The following four high-level persons from southern Afghanistan were killed in July: Ahmad Wali Karzai, Head of Kandahar Provincial Council; Hikmatullah Hikmat, Head of Kandahar Ulema Shura; Jan Muhammad Khan, Senior Adviser to the President; and Ghulam Haydar Hamidi, Mayor of Kandahar. News of the assassinations reverberated across the country, raising concerns for the political stability of the south, given the influence exerted by those killed and their ties to the Government in Kabul.

6. On 17 July, the formal process of transition of responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces started in Bamyan, Kabul (except in Sarobi district), Panjsher, the municipalities and corresponding districts of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Mehtarlam and Lashkar Gah. These areas continue to face a resilient insurgency that is attempting to challenge the capacity of Afghan forces to maintain security.

7. At the Security Standing Committee meeting on 28 June, members of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board agreed to an increase in the number of Afghan National Police from 134,000 to 157,000 and the Afghan National Army from 171,600 to 195,000. In addition, they agreed on accelerated efforts to professionalize the police force, as well as on institutional and administrative reforms to the Ministry of the Interior. Emphasis is increasingly on the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces to operate independently, with greater concentration by the international community on providing training to the security forces in core areas, including logistics and support. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) continues to monitor and provide advice both to the Government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on community-based security initiatives, including the Police-e-Mahali (Afghan Local Police), given the possible fallout linked to issues of impunity, command and control, vetting and the risk of ethnically or politically biased militias re-emerging.

B. Political developments

8. On 23 June, a Special Court created by the Supreme Court ordered 62 changes to the composition of the 249-member Wolesi Jirga (Lower House of the National Assembly) after conducting an ad hoc recount. On 3 August, a decision by the Court of Appeals was reported as confirming the Special Court's findings and directing the issue to the attention of the President. On 10 August, President Hamid Karzai issued

a decree instructing the Independent Electoral Commission to finalize the matter without delay. The Commission re-examined the 62 cases highlighted by the Special Court and, on 21 August, announced nine changes to the membership of the Wolesi Jirga. On 3 September, eight of the nine individuals were sworn in amid tight security; the ninth candidate was sworn in on 10 September, upon returning to Kabul.

9. The dispute over the electoral results and over who was the final arbiter was both a source and symptom of ongoing tensions between the different branches of Government. The Wolesi Jirga, which sat through its summer recess in a show of unity against the Special Court, insisted that the election results were final and that the Independent Electoral Commission had the sole authority on the matter. On 10 August, it passed a resolution repeating its demand for the removal of the Attorney General and the six Supreme Court justices who had created the Special Court. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, continued to assert judicial pre-eminence and, on 16 August, demanded that all 62 changes be implemented by the Commission, reiterating that until that was done it would consider the Wolesi Jirga illegitimate. Throughout the period, the candidates who were backed by the Special Court continued to demand, at a series of demonstrations in Kabul, that all 62 changes be implemented, while a coalition composed largely of opposition Members of the National Assembly and their supporters rejected every single change and held a sit-in for several weeks on the grounds of the National Assembly to voice their dissatisfaction. Since the Commission's announcement, the Wolesi Jirga has been divided, with the above-mentioned coalition continuing to reject the new Members of the National Assembly and refusing to attend sessions as long as their nine former colleagues are excluded. Meanwhile, a new group backs the decision of the Commission, arguing that it is an opportunity to end the impasse.

10. During the reporting period, despite vocal protests by the legislators, the executive branch did not announce nominees for senior appointments, including Cabinet Ministers and Supreme Court justices. The National Assembly, however, continued to exercise its oversight function. The Wolesi Jirga summoned the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Tribal Affairs over the cross-border incidents in Kunar. It also summoned the Minister of Commerce and Industries to answer questions over food prices and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Adviser to provide an update on the status of discussions with the United States on a possible strategic partnership. Similarly, the Meshrano Jirga (Upper House of the National Assembly) questioned senior Government officials, including members of the National Disaster Management Authority, about provisions to flood and drought victims, and the Minister of the Interior, about the security situation. Progress on the legislative agenda was slowed down by the focus on the debate over the composition of the Wolesi Jirga and activities of the Special Court, but three bills were passed through the two Houses: the Law on Forests, the Afghan National Army Personnel Affairs Law and the Extradition Law.

11. The High Peace Council and its Joint Secretariat continued their outreach activities, including field trips to Herat, Paktya, Paktika, Kandahar, Takhar and Badakhshan, inaugurating provincial peace committees. They also travelled to Norway, Germany, Indonesia and India, garnering support for the Afghan-led peace process and participating in initiatives to foster a political dialogue. UNAMA continued to offer assistance to the High Peace Council through its Salaam Support

Group. My Special Representative regularly engaged the High Peace Council leadership on views and ideas to promote reconciliation as part of a broader and inclusive peace process. On 28 July, the Taliban issued a public statement asking that it be recognized as a political and military power, in order to play a role in the peace and stability of Afghanistan and the region. In addition, the Taliban called on States in the region to create an environment of cooperation and trust based on common national interests.

12. With the adoption of its resolutions 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011) on 17 June, the Security Council decided to divide the sanctions list established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and to establish two separate sanctions committees, one targeting individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban and one targeting Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them. On 18 July, the Council approved the de-listing of 15 former Taliban names from the sanctions list established pursuant to its resolution 1988 (2011). Government and the High Peace Council officials welcomed the de-listing and the establishment of two separate committees, recognizing them as important steps in reconciliation and confidence-building.

13. According to the Joint Secretariat, 2,374 reintegrees had joined the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme as at the end of July, 431 more than in the previous month. Twenty-three provincial peace committees have been formed and approved and are functioning. In addition, provincial Joint Secretariat teams have become operational in 25 provinces. Two training workshops for staff members of those bodies, including their heads, were conducted in June and July with a view to further strengthening their capacities to implement the Programme. Standard operating procedures on vetting, transition assistance, provincial accounts and small grants were approved and distributed to provincial authorities.

C. Regional cooperation

14. The Government of Afghanistan continued to strengthen its dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring countries. In the context of the recently established Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Commission for Reconciliation and Peace, the operational tier of the Commission met in Kabul on 29 June. Representatives of Pakistan reaffirmed support for peace and reconciliation efforts led by Afghanistan and their readiness to encourage and facilitate an inclusive process. In Kabul on 20 July, the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, met with President Karzai to discuss regional and international issues, bilateral relations in political, economic and trade matters, as well as joint efforts against terrorism. It was decided that the Minister for Commerce and Industries of Afghanistan would travel to Islamabad to follow up on challenges to transit between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

15. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, which became operational on 12 June, could represent a significant milestone in facilitating regional trade. Full implementation of the Agreement is now the key to delivering practical economic benefits.

16. Tripartite core group meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States of America were held in Kabul on 28 June and in Islamabad on 2 August. The meetings focused on border security, reconciliation and economic issues.

17. The International Contact Group met on 27 June, for the first time in Kabul. In addition, meetings of the Group's regional cooperation working group were held in Istanbul on 3 June and in Kabul on 26 June. The meetings were co-chaired by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, the Special Representative of Turkey for Afghanistan and Pakistan and my Special Representative. The meetings focused on prioritizing areas for regional cooperation and on the preparations for the Istanbul Conference on Afghanistan, to be held on 2 November 2011. UNAMA and my Special Representative, at the request of the Government of Afghanistan and in cooperation with the Government of Turkey, are supporting the Government of Afghanistan, which will chair the event, in the preparations for the Conference.

18. Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan held a summit in Tehran on 25 June. The Presidents of the three countries signed a declaration on strengthening joint counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism efforts and on expanding political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.

19. An international conference on fighting terrorism, held in Tehran on 25 and 26 June 2011, was attended by the Heads of State of countries in the region, including Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan and Tajikistan. The United Nations was also represented.

20. A third quadripartite meeting of the Presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan was held in Dushanbe on 2 September 2011. The leaders of the four countries discussed regional trade and cooperation issues, focusing on joint projects in energy, agriculture, trade and transit. The parties emphasized the importance of implementing the Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Trade (CASA-1000) project, which involves building electricity transmission lines from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan and constructing a trans-Afghanistan gas pipeline. The political agenda for the meeting included items on cooperation in preventing terrorism and extremism and fighting drug trafficking. The Presidents paid special attention to issues related to Afghanistan, including reconciliation, transition and the Kabul Process.

III. Human rights

21. Concerns about the protection of civilians increased with the rise in civilian deaths and injuries. In its mid-year report on the protection of civilians for the first six months of 2011, UNAMA documented 1,462 civilian deaths, an increase of 15 per cent over the same period in 2010, with anti-Government elements responsible for 80 per cent of the deaths, an increase of 28 per cent compared with the same period in 2010. Pro-Government forces were responsible for 14 per cent of civilian deaths, a decrease of 9 per cent over the same period in 2010. In 6 per cent of cases, the civilian deaths could not be attributed to either party to the conflict.

22. From June to August, UNAMA documented 971 civilian deaths and 1,411 injuries, an increase of 5 per cent in civilian casualties compared with the same period in 2010. Anti-Government elements were linked to 1,841 civilian casualties (77 per cent) and pro-Government forces to 282 (12 per cent). The remaining casualties could not be attributed to either party to the conflict. The increase can be attributed, in the context of overall intensified fighting, mainly to the use by anti-Government elements of landmine-like pressure-plate improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks, in violation of international humanitarian law.

Improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks accounted for 45 per cent of civilian casualties, an increase of 177 per cent compared with the same period in 2010. In a disturbing development, anti-Government elements attacked two hospitals and several mosques, places protected under international law. On 25 June, a suicide attack against a hospital in Logar Province killed 25 civilians, including 13 children, and injured 25 others. Targeted killings of high-profile Government officials and individuals associated or perceived to be associated with the Government and/or ISAF occurred throughout the country (see para. 5 above).

23. Air strikes remained the leading cause of civilian deaths by pro-Government forces, killing 38 civilians in July, the highest number recorded in any month since February 2010. The number of civilian deaths from ground combat and armed clashes increased by 84 per cent compared with the same period in 2010. UNAMA documented 38 civilian deaths (7 per cent of all deaths) due to military search operations, a 15 per cent increase over the same period in 2010. Civilian casualties from air strikes and night raids continued to generate anger and resentment among Afghan communities towards international military forces.

24. UNAMA increased its advocacy and monitoring of the implementation of the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women by police, prosecutors and judges. Judicial authorities are increasingly becoming aware of the law. Prosecutors in 28 provinces registered complaints under the law in the past year, although less than one quarter of the cases reached the courts. Instances of violence against women and impunity for perpetrators remained widespread, with much of the violence grounded in harmful traditional practices such as forced and underage marriage. Authorities often failed to investigate and arrest perpetrators of acts criminalized by the law while continuing to arrest women and girls who attempted to flee forced marriages or family abuse, charging them with the intent to commit adultery. UNAMA assisted provincial governors and departments of women affairs in establishing and strengthening provincial commissions for the prevention of violence against women and conducted awareness programmes for members of civil society and officials in 13 provinces.

25. UNAMA advocated the participation of civil society, particularly women, victims and their families, in peace and reconciliation processes, including the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, stressing the need for dialogue between local populations and those negotiating peace, as well as inclusive representation in all decision-making forums. UNAMA has raised concerns about justice and accountability, including the vetting of former combatants, to ensure that known violators of human rights do not benefit from the Programme, and has advocated that all grievance resolution processes be transparent, be conducted at the community level and not be a substitute for criminal prosecution.

26. In June, under the United Nations country team gender working group initiative in Daykundi, Afghanistan, senior justice officials were trained in the application of protection mechanisms to safeguard women's rights. To date, 6 judges, 22 prosecutors, 28 judicial police officers and 89 community and religious leaders have been trained on land and family law and on the protection of women and children in criminal proceedings.

27. UNAMA continued to observe detention facilities across Afghanistan, including through visits to detention facilities of the National Directorate of Security and the Afghan national police in Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Kapisa,

Laghman and Takhar to monitor arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and fair trial guarantees. UNAMA investigated allegations of ill-treatment and lengthy detention without charge or trial and lack of access to defence counsel in cases involving conflict-related detainees, including children. UNAMA is discussing with the Government its findings related to the serious mistreatment of detainees in several facilities managed by the National Directory of Security and the national police.

28. Together with the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNAMA facilitated a capacity assessment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission in May and July 2011. The assessment found that, in order to ensure the long-term sustainability and independence of the Commission, there was a need for a strong legislative framework, increased State funding and closer cooperation with the Government. UNAMA, with international partners, continues to assist the Commission in developing its capacity to fulfil its mandate. UNAMA provided technical assistance to the Human Rights Support Unit of the Ministry of Justice for the development of an action plan to implement the recommendations of the Human Rights Council identified under the 2009 universal periodic review.

29. In the context of the rights of the child, research conducted by UNAMA in five provinces indicated that anti-Government elements recruited children to carry out suicide attacks, plant improvised explosive devices and smuggle weapons and uniforms, and that the Afghanistan National Security Forces recruited boys, with sexual exploitation as one motivating factor. On 6 July, the Minister of the Interior issued a decree reaffirming the commitment of the Government to prevent underage recruitment sexual exploitation and the killing and maiming of children, all of which contravene national and international laws, by members of its security forces. In a letter to Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Jaweed Ludin, my Special Representative, on behalf of the United Nations, welcomed the decree. It is crucial that the action plan, which lists measures to be taken against perpetrators, be implemented without further delay.

IV. Governance and the rule of law

30. Within the broader efforts to address corruption in Afghanistan and as part of the recommendation of the London and Kabul conferences to establish a monitoring and evaluation committee, UNAMA and UNDP worked collectively to support the second joint national and international session of the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, with UNDP serving as temporary secretariat of the body. The Committee is currently finalizing a workplan for the secretariat and identifying benchmarks in the fight against corruption. Donors are coordinating efforts to address corruption through the International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group, which has agreed to support the Committee in the implementation of the final workplan.

31. In July, the draft national priority programme on law and justice was released. The final national priority programme is expected to function as the justice sector reform strategy for the next three years, placing considerable emphasis on extending the reach of the formal justice system to the provinces and districts. Some parts of the justice system have shown improvement, for example, in terms of providing more legal aid, holding public trials and using evidence rather than confessions as

the basis for convictions. Nonetheless, the justice system continues to face problems, not the least of which is security — a key reason behind the decision to transfer the Central Prison Directorate from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior. I remain concerned that the transfer may detract from the gains achieved in that sector in recent years and that, unless the appropriate structural safeguards are put in place within the Ministry of the Interior, the risk of human rights abuses in prisons will increase.

V. Implementation of the Kabul Process and aid coherence

32. During the reporting period, the Government of Afghanistan and the international community continued to implement the Kabul Process, the process of transition to Afghan leadership and responsibility, which was reaffirmed at the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Kabul on 20 July 2010, including the recent convening, after an eight-month hiatus, of the three standing committees of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (on security, governance and socio-economic development) on 28 June and on 25 and 26 July. It was agreed that the standing committees would be reconvened in the last quarter of 2011, thus ensuring the continued integrity of the Kabul Process.

33. The three standing committees recommended that seven national priority programmes be presented for endorsement by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board at its next meeting and agreed, in principle, to an additional six such programmes. The Government of Afghanistan initiated consultations on key governance national priority programmes with a clear commitment to ensuring the finalization of programmes focused on governance and public administration reform at the subnational level. Additionally, it was agreed that the Government of Afghanistan and the international community would establish a task force to initiate consultations on the modification of four of the governance benchmarks agreed to at the International Conference on Afghanistan held in London on 28 January 2010 and the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Kabul on 20 July 2010.

34. The standing committees agreed to the implementation of the operational guide for "off-budget" support of the Government of Afghanistan. Advancing this key policy document is a critical commitment of the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Kabul and is fundamental to continued discussions on improving aid effectiveness. Through a procedure of certification, donors could have their "off-budget" assistance included in an expanded national budget that would allow for multiple resourcing modalities while ensuring Afghan leadership over development and governance resources.

35. On 29 and 30 June, the Government of Afghanistan held a two-day conference to review and address issues relating to the ongoing process of transition of security responsibility to the Afghan authorities. On the first day of the conference Afghan stakeholders, including governors and representatives from ministries and civil society, considered ways to improve coherence within the Government's structures and policies, particularly at the subnational level. On the second day, Government officials were joined by members of the international community, including my Special Representative, to discuss ways to synchronize international support with the principles of Afghan leadership and ownership. The majority of actors involved in the transition process have acknowledged the need to ensure the inclusion of

governance and development strategies in transition areas. As an observer of the process, UNAMA continued to engage with Government and ISAF interlocutors and to work closely with provincial development councils and sector-specific working groups, led by line ministries.

36. Negotiations on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme continued. There was greater clarity and understanding between the Government of Afghanistan and IMF on the next steps that need to be taken before an IMF programme can be approved. In recent weeks, the Government has made progress on a number of preconditions for such a programme, which the international community has acknowledged and recognized as a positive development. Discussions on an IMF mission to Kabul in the near future are currently under way. Failure to agree on an IMF programme could have serious negative consequences regarding the ability of several donors to contribute to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the delivery of essential programmes.

VI. Development and humanitarian assistance

37. Humanitarian and development needs in Afghanistan remained high both in scale and scope. The deteriorating security situation hampered safe access to people in need, and the increasing effects of drought-like conditions, caused by low levels of precipitation, created greater needs, particularly in the north. In parts of Balkh, Jawzjan, Faryab, Sari Pul and Samangan provinces, all of the rain-fed crops were lost and many families were estimated to have seen 50 per cent of their livestock die owing to lack of water and animal fodder. Food insecurity and lack of access to clean water led to disease outbreaks.

38. Current needs assessment estimates suggest that as many as 1.3 million Afghans may require some kind of food assistance over the next 10 months, either through cash-for-work schemes or direct food distributions. Over the coming weeks, the Government and humanitarian organizations, with the support of donors, will undertake the emergency interventions necessary to limit the possibility of a major crisis later in the year. In the absence of effective recovery and development programmes, including for disaster risk reduction, the humanitarian community continued to provide assistance to address the life-threatening consequences of recurrent seasonal disasters such as flash flooding. During the reporting period, humanitarian agencies responded with food and non-food relief assistance to the approximately 9,000 families that were most seriously affected by recurrent seasonal disasters in the provinces of Nimroz, Logar, Balkh, Bamyan, Daykundi, Badghis and Herat.

39. Despite the drought, a number of food and agriculture initiatives continued. Seed enterprises supported by the United Nations will meet the 30,000-ton target of certified wheat seed production. The dairy unions produced 2,500 tons of concentrated animal feed for emergency distribution. Other interventions at the household level included "backyard development poultry" projects aimed at 13,000 women in 13 districts in 2011.

40. The ongoing conflict resulted in the displacement of an estimated 130,000 people between 1 January and the end of July 2011, reflecting an increase of 64 per cent over the same period in 2010. The United Nations, through the protection, emergency shelter and non-food items cluster and the internally displaced persons

task force, coordinates responses to the rising rates of displacement. A key challenge is the spread of dry conditions and drought across much of the northern and eastern regions, which increases vulnerabilities and is anticipated to lead to the displacement of even more people.

41. During the reporting period, United Nations agencies supported the Government of Afghanistan to complete the national reproductive health strategy and action plan and the first national policy and strategy of nursing and midwifery services. The National Maternal and Child Survival Committee and eight provincial committees have been established and are now functional. With continued support to the polio eradication initiative, over 10.8 million children under the age of 5 were vaccinated between May and July.

42. "Child friendly" status was awarded to 357 schools, which provided improved sanitation and hygiene facilities with United Nations support. During the reporting period, an additional 68,000 people in rural areas were provided with sustainable sources of safe water, and almost 144,000 families benefited from an emergency response effort led by the agencies of the water, sanitation and health cluster to address cases of acute watery diarrhoea brought about by the drought in the north. For the first time in Afghanistan, two national water quality testing laboratories were established, enabling testing countrywide, which will help improve the authorities' capacity to monitor and address outbreaks of communicable diseases.

43. The United Nations conducted training sessions to strengthen the capacity of extension officers, heads of cooperatives and members of producer groups, youth and women associations, community development councils and district development assemblies on agricultural technology and food processing and preservation. In support of the National Skills Development Programme, the United Nations provided over 48,000 individuals, of whom 55 per cent were women, with vocational skills training across 20 provinces. Community-managed savings and credit facilities were introduced in 20 provinces to promote access to financial services by microenterprises. To date, $1.1 million in savings has been collected by community self-help groups and $7 million was disbursed to community development councils to generate loans in nine provinces.

44. In the context of promoting sustainable livelihoods, over 26.8 square kilometres of agricultural land were cleared of mines and 7,435 mines were removed from 268 minefields, benefiting 73,000 Afghans. In addition, 14,000 Afghans continued to be employed in 24 community-based demining projects; their salaries, coupled with vocational training, will provide them with opportunities to improve their livelihoods once mine clearance in their villages has been completed. With support from the United Nations, the Forestry Law of Afghanistan was approved by the lower house of the National Assembly. The law promotes the development of guidelines and mechanisms for communities to participate in and benefit from natural resources management.

45. At the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Kabul in 2010, the United Nations committed to working towards a "delivering as one" programme delivery approach. Efforts are under way to leverage synergies within the United Nations family and to collaborate towards the achievement of specific results on a thematic basis. The integrated strategic framework encompassing UNAMA and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes took effect on 1 July 2011. Monitoring and reporting on the framework will be carried out on a quarterly basis

through the five relevant United Nations working groups on peace, reconciliation and reintegration; subnational governance and the rule of law; human rights; sustainable livelihoods; and maternal and newborn health.

VII. Counter-narcotics

46. Compared with 2010, there was a 65 per cent increase in the eradication of opium poppy fields in 2011, as verified by the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics of Afghanistan and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In 2011, 3,810 hectares of opium poppy fields were eradicated throughout 18 provinces, compared with 2,316 hectares eradicated throughout 11 provinces in 2010. Most fields eradicated in 2011 were in the southern, western and north-eastern regions. In 2011, fewer fields were eradicated in the eastern and northern regions than in 2010. In 2011, the number of security-related incidents occurring during eradication has been significantly higher than in 2010: Government-led eradication teams have been attacked 48 times in 2011, compared with 12 times in 2010.

47. At the end of June 2011, the national average price of dry opium was $274 per kilogram, an increase of 104 per cent compared with June 2010. In 2010, opium production was halved, owing mainly to the opium blight. The historically high prices led to a strong increase in cultivation in northern, north-eastern, southern and western provinces.

48. The Ministry of Counter-Narcotics started the National Drug Control Strategy review process in accordance with the commitments made at the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Kabul. The review will be conducted in consultation with key national and international stakeholders involved in counter-narcotic efforts.

VIII. Mission support

49. The process of upgrading the physical security of the field offices continued, including through the establishment of a new compound in Mazar-e-Sharif. In parallel, major security upgrades were carried out in provincial offices, including the provision of in-compound accommodation for all international staff. In spite of the higher bar set by the new minimum operating security standards established following the attack on the UNAMA office in Mazar-e-Sharif on 1 April 2011, it is anticipated that international staff will be able to return to the upgraded offices in six provinces by the end of September.

50. The overall vacancy rate as at July 2011 was 20.2 per cent for international staff and 9.7 per cent for national staff. Effective 1 July 2011, the Kuwait Joint Support Office was designated a family duty station, in line with General Assembly resolution 65/248, entitled "United Nations common system: report of the International Civil Service Commission".

IX. Observations

51. The reporting period witnessed considerable political volatility and disconcerting levels of insecurity for the Afghan people amid a process of transition

to Afghan leadership and responsibility for security. I am deeply concerned about the increasing number of civilian casualties and the effect that the armed conflict is having on civilians who are caught in the middle. The overall volatile security situation also creates a challenging environment for national and international civilians, including United Nations and UNAMA personnel, to operate in and deliver on their mandates. I urge all parties to respect both the letter and spirit of international humanitarian law and strongly encourage all concerned to take concrete steps to protect civilians, including by discontinuing the use of devices and tactics that indiscriminately target and harm the civilian population. For Afghanistan to emerge from the current conflict, both governmental and non-governmental actors must put respect for universal human rights at the centre of their policies and practices.

52. For the transition to Afghan responsibility for security to be successful, it is important that the Afghanistan National Security Forces continue to demonstrate enhanced independent capability and professionalism to assume an increasing level of responsibility and accountability. The formal agreement to increase the size of the Forces is a positive development along the road to greater Afghan sovereignty and long-term stability.

53. Overall, I remain cautiously optimistic about signals of an emerging dialogue as a prerequisite for the development of a broad-based peace and reconciliation process. I therefore urge all Afghans not to succumb to the politics of mistrust, intimidation, fear or revenge, but rather to work together towards reconciling their differences by engaging in constructive dialogue and shaping the framework for a sustainable peace. The momentum for dialogue and reconciliation may be increasing and we must seize this opportunity while it presents itself. Through the good offices of my Special Representative, UNAMA will continue to promote and assist this process through its Salaam Support Group, at the request of and in coordination with the Government of Afghanistan.

54. The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme has been consolidating after the budget for the Programme was adopted in June. Operational challenges remain, such as the delay in the transfer of funds and subsequent delays in associated development projects, but stakeholders are working to solve the issues. While recognizing that the true potential of the Programme depends upon a successful political process for peace, UNAMA continues to monitor the relevant developments at the national and regional levels and to offer advice and assistance, as requested, to ensure the implementation of the Programme. We look forward to seeing a local grievance resolution process being started so as to ensure that underlying local problems are addressed.

55. Since the inauguration of the National Assembly in January 2011, UNAMA has urged the different branches of Government to work together for a solution to the post-electoral deadlock in line with the Constitution. Responding to correspondence from members of the Wolesi Jirga, on 1 July I wrote to them emphasizing that the issues must be solved in a manner consistent with the principles that underpin Afghan democratic institutions and that does not have a negative impact on peace and stability. UNAMA has continued to back the final authority of the Independent Electoral Commission on electoral issues and, in a statement dated 23 August, welcomed the Commission's announcement as hopefully marking the end of the deadlock and allowing the different branches of Government

to focus on the work ahead. The months of institutional impasse necessitating political accommodation highlight the need for wider buy-in by all Afghan parties on a future electoral framework.

56. The formation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Commission for Reconciliation and Peace was a positive development that provides a regular structured mechanism for the two countries to discuss and exchange views on reconciliation issues. It is up to both countries to ensure that the Joint Commission becomes effective in facilitating the reconciliation of anti-Government elements and addressing the cross-border dimension of the insurgency. Meetings should continue. Similarly, it is hoped that the tripartite meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States will yield positive results in lessening tensions across the border and increasing trust, and that implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement — a significant instrument in facilitating the movement of commodities within the region — can advance cooperatively.

57. The importance of regional cooperation to strengthening the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan cannot be overstated. All States are encouraged to participate in supporting this process in an active and positive manner with a view to further progress being made at the conferences to be held in Istanbul and Bonn later in 2011.

58. The United Nations will continue to support efforts, not only to ensure coherent approaches on the ground by the wide variety of international actors, but also to advocate the need to secure the support of such actors in the long term, including with regard to official development assistance. Coordinated support is necessary if Afghanistan is to meet immediate socio-economic needs and strengthen the institutions that provide basic services to the population, notably in the areas of security, justice, social services and natural resource and disaster management, and thus to make progress towards the Millennium Development Goals by 2020, the target date agreed by Afghanistan. A comprehensive approach on transition to support the medium- and long-term development of Afghanistan and its proper governance should underpin this process. If effective, this approach could rectify the current imbalance between the emphasis placed on security and that placed on governance and development. From a development perspective, the current transition process raises a number of core issues. First, the importance of recognizing that development, governance and the rule of law are crucial if transition is to be sustainable and irreversible. Much will depend on success in strengthening institutions, particularly at the subnational level, on creating jobs and economic opportunities and on access to and delivery of basic justice. Second, although development, governance and the rule of law cannot be delivered in the three-year time frame to 2014 set for the transfer of responsibility for security, there is scope for capturing the current political and financial interest in transition in order to accelerate activities that can help set Afghanistan on a sustainable development course. Third, transition as currently conceived is not easily sustainable, as the multitude of operational and support costs associated with development projects have not been fully assessed. Fourth, the Government of Afghanistan will therefore need long-term international support and private sector investment to boost revenue generation. UNAMA will continue to raise concerns on the broader issues associated with transition, not least its impact on Afghan civilians, who must see their security, human rights and economic opportunities increase as a result of the transfer of responsibilities to the Government of Afghanistan.

59. Governance and development programmes prioritized for implementation in transition should be consistent with the goals set forth in the Kabul Process and the national priority programmes. Hence, assistance should be channelled through and reinforce the established Afghan structures in providing effective governance and delivery of services to the population. The momentum behind the security transition should not be at the expense of, or outstrip, efforts to invest in governance and development processes, particularly as resources in other areas decline. UNAMA welcomes initiatives from the Government to strengthen coherent governance arrangements, management and budgetary capacity at the subnational level and seeks further systemic approaches to capacity development and planning. It is my hope that the Kabul Bank issue will be resolved in a principled and accountable manner, and in a way that does not penalize beneficiaries of programmes that are now in jeopardy as a result of the failure to agree on an IMF programme.

60. The humanitarian situation also continues to be of concern, due to the combination of conflict and natural disasters that exacerbate the effects of chronic poverty and vulnerabilities on the population. However, I am encouraged by the efforts made by the Government and the humanitarian community to respond to the current drought. An ongoing challenge is to ensure a high level of shared understanding of the humanitarian situation, whether relating to populations affected and displaced by insecurity and conflict or to acute needs generated by crop failure or natural disasters. The United Nations is working with national and local authorities and all humanitarian actors to improve analytical tools and strengthen disaster management and preparedness, and encourages the sharing of practical experiences in improving access to people in need. I wish to join in the calls made to mark World Humanitarian Day in Afghanistan: we must not lose sight of the needs of Afghans caught up in the conflict. All parties must respect the principles of humanitarian action in the delivery of assistance, recognizing the imperative of protecting civilians, as well as of safeguarding humanitarian personnel and allowing them access to affected populations.

61. Afghanistan remains by far the largest source of illicit opium and heroin traded globally. The negative impact of illegal narcotics continues to be felt at the national, regional and global levels. In a United Nations report dated July 2011, it was estimated that groups involved in transnational organized crime profited most from the trade, valued at $68 billion, and that Afghan farmers earned only $440 million of that total, undermining efforts made to improve governance and the rule of law. In addition, the health and security implications continue to have profound consequences for the social fabric of society, not just in Afghanistan but in many other countries too. While I am pleased to note the efforts made by the Afghan authorities in reducing production, a global problem of this scale requires global efforts and so I encourage all Member States to continue cooperating in addressing this situation.

62. I would like to thank my Special Representative, Staffan de Mistura, as well as all the UNAMA and United Nations personnel in Afghanistan, both national and international, for their tireless efforts under very challenging conditions. I would also like to thank Deputy Special Representative Martin Kobler, whom I have appointed as my Special Representative in Iraq, for his dedication and enthusiasm in serving the people of Afghanistan.

United Nations S/2011/591

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 September 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 21 September 2011 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my report of 30 August 2011 (S/2011/549) on Somalia, in which I expressed concern about the critical gaps that remain in the United Nations support package for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and which continue to adversely impact the effectiveness of AMISOM.

In the report I stated that expanding the scope of the support package to provide predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM would be consistent with the spirit of Security Council resolution 1863 (2009) and contribute significantly towards raising AMISOM to United Nations standards, while also markedly improving the living conditions and morale of AMISOM troops. I committed to proposing to the Security Council a workable solution to this problem.

My report also highlighted the joint assessment by AMISOM, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM and the Department for Safety and Security, which emphasized the need for a dedicated capacity within AMISOM to provide security to United Nations personnel and AMISOM civilians. I stated that as the international community expands its footprint, strengthened security arrangements are essential. Accordingly, I expressed support for the rapid deployment of a guard force.

The purpose of this letter is to provide more information about the inclusion of some additional support requirements for AMISOM troops into the United Nations support package, and the proposed AMISOM guard force.

These proposals are made with due cognizance that Member States of the United Nations continue to shoulder the high costs of ongoing peacekeeping operations around the world. As these proposals will require additional financing from Member States, efforts have been made to ensure that the additional resources requested are modest, while also achieving the objective of addressing the most urgent needs of AMISOM.

Additional support requirements

Both the United Nations and the African Union require troop-contributing countries to deploy to peacekeeping missions on a sustainable basis. In United Nations peacekeeping operations such sustainment comprises basic and essential supplies and services, for example, catering; tactical communications and information technology (IT); cleaning and sanitary supplies; and welfare, which

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would be reimbursed to troop contributors that have deployed with limited sustainment capabilities. There is a need for enhanced support in certain areas in order to improve standards and provide a better quality of life for AMISOM troops. I therefore propose that the United Nations include the following additional support requirements in its logistical support package to AMISOM:

Additional support requirement	*Description*
Catering	Catering: provision of equipment (stoves, reefers, pots, pans, kitchen uniforms, etc.) and training to ensure preparation of safe rations according to standards
Communications and IT	Additional VHF/UHF, HF, telephone, TETRA communications for additional troops to ensure secure communication across AMISOM forces
General stores, cleaning, furniture	General supplies, including sanitary and cleaning materials, some furniture, stationery, etc.
Welfare	Sports and entertainment equipment to allow temporary relief in a high stress environment

I look forward to the Security Council giving favourable consideration to this proposal. AMISOM operates in a very dangerous environment in pursuit of a difficult mandate on behalf of the international community. It is therefore necessary that AMISOM forces be accorded this essential support to enhance their effectiveness, well-being and morale.

AMISOM guard force

At present, the responsibility for the security of the United Nations personnel, assets and AMISOM civilians rests with AMISOM. It provides escort and protection for United Nations personnel and Very Important Persons when travelling outside the secure Mogadishu International Airport compound for meetings with the Transitional Federal Government officials or to visit sites further afield. However, these responsibilities have proved to be a strain on the limited resources of AMISOM. I recommend that a dedicated guard force be established to perform the following functions:

- Provide security at key African Union and United Nations installations
- Provide security of AMISOM personnel and assets
- Provision of armed escort for the safe movement of personnel and assets
- Provide support during emergency situations such as relocation or evacuation to secure sites.

The force would be a dedicated unit of AMISOM, although under the overall command of the Force Commander. As the AMISOM military concept of operations envisages a total force strength of 12,000 for its current responsibilities, the requested guard force would be within the current mandated strength of AMISOM.

The guard force would be of an appropriate size in order to effectively perform the envisaged tasks, which would include the following:

Tasks
Protection of African Union civilian and United Nations common compound within Mogadishu International Airport
Protection of African Union/United Nations information support compound/ communication hub
Protection of forward logistics base
Protection of United Nations compound at seaport
Protection of United Nations compound at university camp
Protection of United Nations common compound in Mogadishu
Escort African Union/United Nations/international missions outside Mogadishu International Airport
Mobile reserve
Command control and support staff

The guard force would receive from the United Nations the same logistical support package offered to the rest of the AMISOM force.

I look forward to a favourable consideration of this proposal by the Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations A/66/371–S/2011/592

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
23 September 2011

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 116
Admission of new Members to the United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations

Note by the Secretary-General

In accordance with rule 135 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate herewith the attached application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations, contained in a letter received on 23 September 2011 from its President (see annex I). He also has the honour to circulate a further letter, dated 23 September 2011, received from him at the same time (see annex II).

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Annex I

Letter received on 23 September 2011 from the President of Palestine to the Secretary-General

Application of the State of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations

I have the profound honour, on behalf of the Palestinian people, to submit this application of the State of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations.

This application for membership is being submitted based on the Palestinian people's natural, legal and historic rights and based on United Nations General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 as well as the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine of 15 November 1988 and the acknowledgement by the General Assembly of this Declaration in resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988.

In this connection, the State of Palestine affirms its commitment to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the vision of two-States living side by side in peace and security, as endorsed by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly and the international community as a whole and based on international law and all relevant United Nations resolutions.

For the purpose of this application for admission, a declaration made pursuant to rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and rule 134 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly is appended to this letter (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would transmit this letter of application and the declaration to the Presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly as soon as possible.

(*Signed*) Mahmoud **Abbas**
President of the State of Palestine
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Palestine Liberation Organization

Enclosure

Declaration

In connection with the application of the State of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations, I have the honour, in my capacity as the President of the State of Palestine and as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to solemnly declare that the State of Palestine is a peace-loving nation and that it accepts the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertakes to fulfill them.

(*Signed*) Mahmoud **Abbas**
President of the State of Palestine
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Palestine Liberation Organization

Annex II

Letter dated 23 September 2011 from the President of Palestine to the Secretary-General

After decades of displacement, dispossession and the foreign military occupation of my people and with the successful culmination of our State-building program, which has been endorsed by the international community, including the Quartet of the Middle East Peace Process, it is with great pride and honour that I have submitted to you an application for the admission of the State of Palestine to full membership in the United Nations.

On 15 November 1988, the Palestine National Council (PNC) declared the Statehood of Palestine in exercise of the Palestinian people's inalienable right to self-determination. The Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine was acknowledged by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988. The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and independence and the vision of a two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been firmly established by General Assembly in numerous resolutions, including, inter alia, resolutions 181 (II) (1947), 3236 (XXIX) (1974), 2649 (XXV) (1970), 2672 (XXV) (1970), 65/16 (2010) and 65/202 (2010) as well as by United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 1397 (2002) and by the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 (on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory). Furthermore, the vast majority of the international community has stood in support of our inalienable rights as a people, including to statehood, by according bilateral recognition to the State of Palestine on the basis of the 4 June 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the number of such recognitions continues to rise with each passing day.

Palestine's application for membership is made consistent with the rights of the Palestine refugees in accordance with international law and the relevant United Nations resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 194 (III) (1948), and with the status of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Palestinian leadership reaffirms the historic commitment of the Palestine Liberation Organization of 9 September 1993. Further, the Palestinian leadership stands committed to resume negotiations on all final status issues — Jerusalem, the Palestine refugees, settlements, borders, security and water — on the basis of the internationally endorsed terms of reference, including the relevant United Nations resolutions, the Madrid principles, including the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet Roadmap, which specifically requires a freeze of all Israeli settlement activities.

At this juncture, we appeal to the United Nations to recall the instructions contained in General Assembly resolution 181 (II) (1947) and that "sympathetic consideration" be given to application of the State of Palestine for admission to the United Nations.

Accordingly, I have had the honour to present to Your Excellency the application of the State of Palestine to be a full member of the United Nations as well as a declaration made pursuant to rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure

of the Security Council and rule 134 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. I respectfully request that this letter be conveyed to the Security Council and the General Assembly without delay.

(*Signed*) Mahmoud **Abbas**
President of the State of Palestine
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Palestine Liberation Organization

United Nations S/2011/593

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 September 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 19 September 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the enclosed agreements reached between the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan during the first meeting of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, held on 7 and 8 September 2011 in Addis Ababa (see annexes I-VI).

I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex I

Having held the first meeting of The Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) on 7th and 8th September, 2011 in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, the AJOC agreed to the following;

1. The Abyei Joint Oversight Committee Terms of Reference
    - Annex One Terms of Reference for the AJOC Secretariat
    - Annex Two Terms of Reference for the AJOC Executive Officers
2. Redeployment Plans for all Authorized Forces within Abyei
3. Draft Instrument on Security Related Functions
4. Record of decisions of the AJOC meeting of 8th September, 2011

Signed by

Governor Omer Suleiman,

Co-Chairman of the Government of Sudan

H.E Deng Alor Kuol

For Co-Chairman of the Government of South Sudan

Witnessed by



Mr. Boitshoko Mokgatlhe

African Union Facilitator to the AJOC

and

Lt. Gen. Tadesse Tesfay

Force Commander, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

Annex II

Abyei Joint Oversight Committee

Terms of Reference

References:

- Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area dated 20th June 2011. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Abyei protocol.
- PCA ruling.

Membership:

- Two members from each State (one from each nominated as Co-Chairs). Only in exceptional circumstances can nominated AJOC member be represented by mandated alternatives.
  - GoSS: Nominated Members:
    - Dr Luka Biong Deng.
    - Cmde Edward Lino.
  - GoS: Nominated Members:
    - Former Govenor Omar Suleiman.
    - Brigadier Mohieldin AhmedElhadi.
- African Union – Non-voting member and facilitator.
- UNISFA Force commander – Non-voting member for security discussions.
- AJOC shall have a permanent secretariat and executive officers from both State based in Abyei.

Frequency:

- AJOC shall on a monthly basis. TheStates may request the AJOC to meet more frequently, as required – in the initial stages daily or bi-weekly meeting may be required.

Reporting:

- AJOC shall make a monthly report to respective Presidents and when is necessary.
- AJOC call for a monthly briefings from the UNISFA Force Commander and be prepared to receive ad-hoc briefing as produced by the UNISFA Force Commander.

- AJOC shall call for a weekly report from the Abyei Executive Council (when formed) giving an overall picture of the situation in the Abyei Area, including security-related matters.

Functions/Execution:

- The AJOC shall exercise on behalf of the President of Sudan and the President of South Sudan, political and administrative oversight of the Executive Council. The AJOC shall submit a monthly report to the President of Sudan and the President of South Sudan, for as long as the mechanism remains in place.

- The AJOC shall provide timely guidance and decisions to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of the various agreements as well as the establishment and sustainment of a stable and secure environment in Abyei.

- Decisions made by the AJOC shall be made by consensus.

- The Chairpersons shall be responsible for supervising compliance of the various administrative and operational structures, excluding UNISFA, as mandated in the agreements, serve as the final approval, on behalf of the two Presidents, for resolving disputes, making decisions and approving plans.

- The AJOC's meeting agenda will be prepared in draft by the AJOC secretariat for approval of the co-Chairs.

- The approved agenda will be circulated at least 7 days in advance of scheduled AJOC meetings.

- The Presidents may jointly direct the AJOC to deal with any matter relating to Abyei, including in the case of a deadlock in the Executive Council.

- In the case of a deadlock within the AJOC, the AJOC co-Chairs may refer any question to the Presidents for their guidance. The opinions and recommendations of the non-voting member of the AJOC shall be forwarded along with the referral.

- The AJOC may direct the Executive Council or any official or committee of the Abyei Area to provide it with a report on any matter within its powers. The

AJOC may hold meetings with the Executive Council to discuss any matter within its mandate.

Standing Agenda for AJOC Monthly Meeting:

- Briefing from Force Commander on security of Abyei area.
- Report from Abyei Executive Council:
  - Current Situation:
  - Reconciliation:
  - Development/Finance:
  - Humanitarian planning:
- Migration and IDPs.
- AOB:

Administration/Finance of AJOC:

- The GoS and GoSS shall jointly finance the AJOC.
- AJOC meetings will be in Abyei or other locations mutually agreed by AJOC.

Annexes:

Annex 1: Terms of Reference for the AJOC Secretariat

Annex 2: Terms of Reference for the AJOC Executive Officers

Annex 1: Terms of Reference for the AJOC Secretariat

Membership:

- Two administrative support personnel from each State.

Functions/Execution:

- The secretariat shall provide all administrative and logistical support to enable the AJOC to function.
- The secretariat shall be managed by the Executive Officers (Annex 2 outlines membership, functions and administration/finance for the Executive Officers).
- The secretariat shall file and maintain all official documents and correspondence.
- The secretariat shall facilitate the exchange of all official correspondence.
- The secretariat shall prepare minutes and all official reports and circulate them as directed by the AJOC.
- The secretariat shall prepare the agenda for all official meetings and after approval by the Co-chairs shall circulate to the members of the AJOC.
- The secretariat shall prepare, manage and maintain the AJOC administrative and logistical budget.
- The secretariat shall prepare and submit a monthly administrative,financial and logistical report to the AJOC.
- The secretariat shall coordinate and support all movement and travel of the AJOC.
- The secretariat shall be prepared to travel with and provide administrative and logistical support to the AJOC.
- The secretariat shall manage and maintain all AJOC facilities and equipment.
- The secretariat shall maintain at least one representative from each State on duty at all times.

Annex 2: Terms of Reference for the AJOC Executive Officers

Membership:

- Each State shall nominate one representative to be assigned as Executive Officer.

Functions/Execution:

- The Executive Officers will serve as the point of contact in Abyei for AJOC.
- At least one Executive Officer shall be on duty at the AJOC office at all times during the absence of the AJOC co-chairs and members.
- The Executive Officers shall supervise the secretariat.
- The Executive Officers shall maintain a presence in the AJOC offices during duty hours and will provide emergency contact information during non-duty hours.
- The Executive Officers will receive reports, requests and calls on behalf of the AJOC.
- The Executive Officers shall provide periodic reports to the AJOC co-chairs of all activities, reports, requests and calls during their absence.
- The Executive Officers shall immediately notify and maintain contact with the AJOC Co-chairs in the event of an emergency.
- The Executive Officers do not have executive authority, only reporting authority.
- The Executive Officers shall assist the AJOC co-chairs and members as requested.
- The Executive Officers are authorized to convey instructions from the AJOC co-chairs.

Administration/Finance:

- The Executive Officer pay level and schedule shall be determined by the AJOC.

Annex III

Abyei Joint Oversight Committee

Instrument No.1 of 2011

Instrument to Assign Security-related Functions to Abyei Executive Council

1. Pursuant to articles 6 and 14 of the Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, 20th June 2011 (the Principal Agreement), the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee ("the Committee") hereby assigns to the Abyei Executive Council ("the Executive Council") certain functions relating to the management of security and stability in the Abyei Area ("the Area").

2. The Executive Council shall carry out the following functions on behalf of the Committee:

   (a) liaising with the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and other agencies operating within the Area;
   (b) assisting with the recruitment of the Abyei Police Service;
   (c) making preparations for the establishment of the special migration unit of the Abyei Police Service;
   (d) developing of proposals for the management of security and stability aspects of migration;
   (e) monitoring of civilian aspects of security and stability within the Area;
   (f) making general recommendations and proposals for promoting security and stability in the Area;
   (g) developing a work-plan for the fulfilment of the functions set out in this paragraph;
   (h) implementation of security-related decisions taken by the Committee; and,
   (i) any other matter as shall be determined by the Committee.

3. The Executive Council shall submit to the Committee regular briefings and progress reports on the functions set out in paragraph 2 above and shall liaise regularly with the Executive Office of the Committee.

4. The Committee shall, pursuant to the Principal Agreement, retain overall responsibility and powers for supervising and promoting

security and stability in the Area and shall take all the key decisions relating to this mandate.

5. This Instrument shall come into effect as soon as the Executive Council has been established and may be amended or revoked by the Committee.

Done by the Committee in ..... this ..... day of ..... 2011.

Signed on behalf of the Committee by:

i.

ii.

Annex IV

ABYEI JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (AIOC) MEETING
8TH SEPTEMBER 2011 ADDIS ABABA ETHIOPIA
RECORD OF DECISIONS

Agenda/Decisions

Agenda Item	Description	Background	Decision
5	Terms of Reference and Method of Work of AJOC		- AJOC members agreed the Terms of Reference for the AJOC, including establishment of a Secretariat and Executive Officers to be permanently based in Abyei (the agreed AJOC TOR are enclosed). - The Members agreed to announce names of AJOC secretariat and Executive Officers no later than 13th September 2011.
6	Force Commander's Challenges/ Priorities in Priority Order	1. Demilitarization.	Redeployment of Forces is to commence on the 11 September 2011 and be complete by 30 September, beginning with redeployment from Abyei town (the agreed schedule of redeployment is enclosed).
		2. UNISFA Staff Shortfalls.	It was agreed by the members and the UN that discussions to finalize the SOFA would start on 11 September 2011 in Addis Ababa.
		3. Management of IDPs and Migrations.	- Both parties agreed to engage with the UNISFA Force Commander in line with demilitarization and that return would be synchronized with the 'seasonal planting season' (starts in next 3 weeks) and Misseriya migration. - GoSS members stated that funds would be made available for IDP/Demobilization issues and encouraged GoS to do the same. - GoS Co-Chair agreed to accompany the UNISFA Force Commander to Babo with Misseriya currently outside the Abyei area.
		4. Lack of Aviation Mobility.	To be resolved by finalization of the SOFA.
		5. Lack of Ground Mobility.	To be resolved by finalization of the SOFA.
		6. Infrastructure and Logistic Support shortfalls.	- Cost of construction/repair of roads (from Kadugli to Agok) will be shared between parties with additional request for support made from the UN and UN companies. - Other issues of contractors freedom of movement will be resolved by finalization of the SOFA.
		7. Establishment of Civil Institution.	- Both parties agreed for immediate establishment of the civil administration. - GoSS confirmed that the former Abyei Administration would be automatically dissolved.
		8. Declaration of Mined Areas by both SAF and SPLA.	- It was agreed that SPLA and SAF Military Intelligence would meet under the supervision of with UNISFA to exchange maps and would engage UNMAS on immediate plan for demining. - It was agreed that the meeting would take place on 13th September 2011, with a view to conduction demining between 11-30th September 2011.
		9. Agreement on temporary occupation of land for establishment of company operating bases.	It was agreed that the SOFA would cover high-level policy on land use by UNISFA, individual locations covered by a Land occupation agreement would be negotiated with the Abyei Administration (when formed) until such time AJOC would make decisions, and agreed that UNISFA can occupy required locations.
		10. Agreement on Weapon Policy for migrants and others within Abyei Area.	- It was agreed that the Kadugli agreement would remain as the weapons policy for the Abyei area. - GoSS agreed to engage the neighboring southern states (Unity, Bahr el Ghazal, Wharrap) to adopt a similar policy.
		11. Immediate establishment of Abyei Police Services.	AJOC would develop policy on the size, tasks and method of training for the Abyei police service which will operate under UNISFA.
		12. Release of 19 Children under custody of SAF in Abyei.	Members agreed that the prisoners would be released at the beginning of the redeployment (11th September 2011).
		13. Border Demarcation map to be finalized to define inter – mission operational areas.	The Members agreed that the existing border demarcation team would be reconstituted with force protection provided by UNISFA and would also work with the demining teams.
7	Agenda, Date and Venue for Next meeting of AJOC	It was considered essential that the next meeting take place during the first phase of redeployment of forces.	AJOC Members agreed that the next meeting of AJOC will take place in Abyei on 15th September 2011. The agenda will review progress on Redeployment of Forces.
8	AOB	Abyei Area Administration.	AJOC agreed that the Status would continue to work with AUHIP on resolution of the dispute on the composition of the Abyei Area Administration.

Redeployment Plans for all Authorized Forces within Abyei

Timings of redeployment

Serial Number	Timelines	Activities	
1.	11 – 17 September 2011	Partial Redeployment	Both SAF and SPLA
2.	18 - 24 September	Partial Redeployment of SAF	SPLA Redeployment Completed
3.	25 - 30 September	Complete Redeployment from Abyei Area	Both SAF and SPLA


Phase 1 (SAF)
Imlnse
Redeployment Line
Tasks
Monitoring and Verification
11 - 17 September 2011
Along Line Joining Singhal – Oshlop – Soheib – Todach – Saidana – Angor – Al Shalib
– Dumbolaya – Fd Demagla – Kadan.
All SAF troops redeploy to line North of redeployment line.
Sharing of redeployment information, so that monitoring and verification can be undertake by
JMOTs.
Abyei PCA Map
for UNMOs Patrol
03 Jan 2011
All Weather Road
Wet Season Road
Suspect Minefields


Phase 1 SPLA
Timing
Redeployment Line
11 – 17 September 2011
Along Line Johnny EsH Sheshidi – War Yürt – El Fersa – Pa Bion – Mabaal Abiek –
Malbaing – Rumbek
Tasks
Redeploy to area South of the redeployment line.
Monitoring and Verification
Starting of redeployment routine so that monitoring and verification can be undertaken by JMOTs.
Abyei PCA Map
for UNMOs Patrol
03 Jan 2011
All Weather Road
Wet Season Road
Suspect Minefields


Abyei PCA Map
for UNMOs Patrol
Phase 2 (SAF)
Timings
Redeployment Line
: 18 – 24 September 2011
: Along Line Joining Tejeil – El Dewas- Antilla – Um Khaer – Diffra – Meklines – Noljar - Ajuj
Tasks
Monitoring and Verification
: All SAF troops to redeploy to line North of redeployment line.
: Sharing of redeployment routine so that monitoring and verification can be undertake by JMOTs.


Phase 2 (SPLA)
Timings
Redeployment Line
Tasks
Monitoring and Verification
16- 24 September 2011
Complete Demilitarization out of the Abyei AOR
All SPLA troops to redeploy to area South of the redeployment line.
Sharing of redeployment routine so that monitoring and verification can be undertake by JMOTs.
Abyei PCA Map
for UNMOs Patrol
03 Jan 2011
All Weather Road
Wet Season Road
Suspect Minefields


Phase 3 (SAF)
Timing
Redeployment Line
Tasks
Monitoring and Verification
verification
: 24 – 30 September 2011
: Complete Demilitarization out of the Abyei AOR as marked
: All SAF troops to redeploy to area North of the redeployment line.
: Sharing of redeployment routine so that monitoring and
can be undertake by JMOTe.


End State on 30 September 2011
Complete Demilitarization of all authorized forces within the Abyei Area.
Abyei PCA Map
for UNMOs Patrol
03 Jan 2011
All Weather Road
Wet Season Road
Suspect Minefields

Annex VI

PRESS STATEMENT

Launch of Abyei Joint Oversight Committee

Addis Ababa, 8th September 2011: Following the signing of the Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area on 20th June, 2011, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) convened an inaugural meeting of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) in Addis Ababa.

The two-day meeting, which was launched by H.E. President Pierre Buyoya member of the AUHIP, was co-chaired by H.E. Omer Suleiman and H.E. Deng Alor Kuol representing the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan respectively.

Ambassador Kuol Alor Kuol for South Sudan, and Brigadier Mohieldin Ahmed Elhadi for Sudan attended as members. Mr. Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, representing the African Union Commission, and the UNISFA Force Commander, Lt Gen. Tadesse Tesfay participated as the non-voting members.

The meeting adopted modalities for the work of the AJOC, which shall base its work in Abyei to oversee the administration of the Abyei Area and to take responsibility for security issues in particular.

After receiving a briefing from the Force Commander, the meeting agreed on a timetable for the redeployment of all forces out of the Abyei Area, to commence on 11th September 2011 and to be completed by 30th September 2011.

The members of the AJOC agreed, in their work, to keep in mind the interests of the local communities, especially as the planting and migration seasons are due to commence soon.

On behalf of the AUHIP, President Buyoya commended the two Governments for the successful launch of the AJOC and for taking the decisions necessary for implementing the Abyei Administration and Security Agreement.

The meeting agreed that the AJOC would convene its next meeting in Abyei Town on 15th September 2011.

H.E. Omar Suleiman

Co-chairman , AJOC

H.E Deng Alor Kuol

For Co-chairman AJOC

United Nations S/2011/594

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 September 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 27 September 2011 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 15 September 2011 (S/2011/577), concerning the temporary inter-mission transfer between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. In your letter you sought the advance approval of the Council for the arrangements described therein. I further have the honour to confirm that the Security Council grants such approval.

Your letter specifically contains the following recommendations: that the three armed attack helicopters concurrently redeployed from UNMIL to UNOCI must return to Liberia by 30 September 2011 and should be focused on the border with Côte d'Ivoire, except during the elections period; that beyond the Liberian elections, though still based in Liberia, the armed helicopters should continue to be used in the border areas in both Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, and also in western Côte d'Ivoire; that the Security Council authorize the temporary transfer from UNOCI to UNMIL of one infantry company comprising 150 personnel, as well as three formed police unit platoons with supporting elements, totalling 100 personnel, from 1 October to 30 November 2011; and that the Council authorize UNOCI to place an infantry company comprising 150 personnel, two special forces platoons totalling 80 personnel, and two military utility helicopters on standby in Côte d'Ivoire during the period from 1 October to 30 November 2011, which would be deployed to Liberia only if the situation requires and after the Special Representative for Liberia advises that the evolving situation requires such further reinforcement, upon which the Secretary-General will notify the Council.

The Security Council recalls that, in its resolution 1609 (2005), it authorized the temporary redeployment of military and civilian police personnel between UNMIL and UNOCI, subject to certain conditions including the agreement of the troop-contributing countries and, where relevant, the Governments concerned. In its resolution 2008 (2011), the Council reaffirmed that arrangement, called on troop-contributing countries to support the efforts of the Secretary-General in this regard, and reaffirmed the need for UNMIL and UNOCI to regularly coordinate their strategies and operations to contribute to subregional security. The Council notes that, in your letter, you indicated that you are in the process of seeking the consent of the troop- and police-contributing countries concerned for the temporary redeployment you have recommended. Consistent with resolution 2008 (2011), in order to provide support for the upcoming presidential and legislative elections in

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Liberia and mindful of the need to support the ability of UNOCI to carry out its mandate, notably with regard to the expected legislative elections in Côte d'Ivoire and the cross-border security challenges for both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, the Council concurs with the temporary inter-mission transfer described above, provided that you receive the consent indicated above.

Finally, the Security Council notes your recommendation that options be kept open for the possible use of helicopters from UNMIL to address security challenges in Côte d'Ivoire, including Abidjan, and for the possible temporary relocation of the helicopters to UNOCI during the anticipated Ivorian legislative elections. The Council stands ready to respond appropriately to any such relocation request.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
President of the Security Council

United Nations S/2011/595

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 September 2011

Original: English

France, Germany, Nigeria, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President concerning the situation in Somalia, protection of civilians in armed conflict, women and peace and security, and children and armed conflict,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia,

Reiterating its full support for the Djibouti Peace Process and the Transitional Federal Charter which provide the framework for reaching a lasting political solution in Somalia, *recognizing* the need to promote reconciliation and dialogue among the Somali population, and *stressing* the importance of broad-based and representative institutions reached through a political process ultimately inclusive of all,

Reaffirming its support for the Transitional Federal Government in its role as part of the Djibouti Peace Process, *stressing* the primary responsibility of the Transitional Federal Institutions to work in a cohesive and united manner and to intensify their efforts to complete the transitional tasks set out by the Djibouti Agreement and the Transitional Charter, and calling on the Transitional Federal Institutions to coordinate closely with other Somali groups, including local and regional administrations,

Reiterating its emphasis on the need for a comprehensive strategy to encourage the establishment of peace and security in Somalia through the collaborative effort of all stakeholders,

Commending the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Dr. Augustine Mahiga, as well as that of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia (SRCC) Ambassador Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra and *reaffirming* its strong support for their efforts,

Welcoming the work of former President Jerry Rawlings as the African Union High Representative for Somalia,

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Recalling the signing of the Kampala Accord on 9 June 2011, *noting* the decision to defer elections of the President and Speaker and his deputies for 12 months until 20 August 2012 under the terms of the Accord and *strongly urging* the signatories to honour their obligations,

Welcoming the agreement of a roadmap, facilitated by SRSG Mahiga, at the Consultative Meeting held in Mogadishu on 6 September, that sets out key tasks and priorities to be delivered by the Transitional Federal Institutions over the next 12 months, with clear timelines, benchmarks and compliance mechanisms, *urging* the Transitional Federal Institutions as holding the primary responsibility for implementing the roadmap, and the other signatories, to adhere to their commitments in the roadmap, and *noting* that future support for the Transitional Federal Institutions will be contingent upon completion of these tasks,

Recognizing that peace and stability in Somalia depend on reconciliation and effective governance across the whole of Somalia and *urging* all Somali parties to renounce violence and to work together to build peace and stability,

Urging the Transitional Federal Institutions to increase their transparency and combat corruption to increase their legitimacy and credibility, and to enable continued support from the international community,

Expressing grave concern at the dire and worsening humanitarian situation in Somalia and the impact of the drought and famine on the people of Somalia, in particular women and children, *calling on* all parties in accordance with international humanitarian law to allow for safe and unhindered access to humanitarian agencies at this critical time, and *underscoring* the importance of upholding the principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence in the provision of humanitarian assistance,

Strongly condemning the targeting, obstruction or prevention of the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia by any parties, especially armed groups, and *deploring* any attacks on humanitarian personnel,

Expressing serious concern that the United Nations consolidated appeal for Somalia is not fully funded, *stressing* the need for urgent mobilisation of resources to those in need and *calling on* all Member States to contribute to current and future consolidated humanitarian appeals,

Commending the contribution of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to lasting peace and stability in Somalia, *recognizing* the significant sacrifices made by these forces, *expressing* its appreciation for the continued commitment of troops and equipment to AMISOM by the Governments of Uganda and Burundi, and *calling on* other African Union Member States to consider contributing troops to AMISOM,

Reiterating its serious concern at the continued fighting in Somalia and its impact on the civilian population, *condemning* all attacks, including terrorist attacks on the Transitional Federal Government, AMISOM and the civilian population by armed opposition groups, and foreign fighters, particularly Al Shabaab, and *stressing* the terrorist threat that Somali armed opposition groups, and foreign fighters, particularly Al Shabaab, constitute for Somalia and for the international community,

Welcoming recent improvements in the security situation in Mogadishu, *commending* the efforts of AMISOM and the Somali Security Forces, *encouraging* them to consolidate these gains and *urging* the Transitional Federal Institutions to capitalise upon the improved security situation by promptly facilitating agreement on and the implementation of a stabilisation plan for Mogadishu and by facilitating the delivery of basic services and providing good governance to all of its citizens,

Calling on the Transitional Federal Government to remain united and redouble its efforts to complete the priority tasks and goals agreed on in the Roadmap paving the ground for a better future for Somalis, including their economic and social development and the realization of their human rights, while *recognizing* the need for the cooperation and support of the international community to the Transitional Federal Government, local and regional administrations in this regard,

Reaffirming the importance of the re-establishment, training, equipping and retention of Somali security forces, which is vital for the long-term stability and security of Somalia, *expressing* support for the on-going European Union Training Mission Somalia, *emphasizing* the importance of coordinated, timely and sustained support from the international community, and *encouraging* the Somali security forces to demonstrate their effectiveness by working with AMISOM to consolidate security throughout Mogadishu,

Commending Member States and organizations which have made contributions in support of AMISOM and Somalia, *encouraging* the international community to mobilize additional funding as appropriate, recognizing the importance of timely and predictable funding, and *stressing* the need for effective coordination among donors, the United Nations and the African Union,

Recalling its resolutions 1950 (2010) and 1976 (2011), *expressing* its grave concern at the threat posed by piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, *recognizing* that the ongoing instability in Somalia contributes to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and hostage taking, *stressing* the need for a comprehensive response to tackle piracy, including the need to investigate and prosecute those who illicitly finance, plan, organize, or unlawfully profit from pirate attacks, and its underlying causes by the international community and the Transitional Federal Institutions and *welcoming* the efforts of the Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, States and international and regional organizations,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's report dated 30 August 2011 (S/2011/549), and its recommendations for continued action on the political, security and recovery tracks by the Transitional Federal Institutions with the support of the international community,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to authorize the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment until 31 October 2012 of AMISOM, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures to carry out its existing mandate as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 1772 (2007), and *requests* the African Union to urgently increase its force

strength to its mandated level of 12,000 uniformed personnel, thereby enhancing its ability to carry out its mandate;

2. *Calls upon* the Transitional Federal Institutions to abide by the terms of the roadmap of key tasks and priorities to be delivered by the Transitional Federal Institutions over the next 12 months, with clear timelines, benchmarks and compliance mechanisms, *notes* the Security Council's future support to the Transitional Federal Institutions will be contingent upon the completion of these tasks, and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide an update on progress made by the Transitional Federal Institutions against the roadmap in his reports to the Security Council;

3. *Notes* the recommendations on Somalia by the African Union Peace and Security Council of 13 September 2011 and *underlines* its intention to keep the situation on the ground under review and to take into account in its future decisions on AMISOM, progress by the Transitional Federal Institutions in completing the key tasks as set out in the roadmap referred to in paragraph 2 above;

4. *Welcomes* the steps taken by UNPOS and other United Nations offices and agencies, including the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), to increase the presence of the United Nations organizations and their staff in Somalia as an important element of the effective fulfilment of their mandate, and *urges* the establishment of a more permanent and increasing presence by the United Nations to Somalia, in particular in Mogadishu, consistent with the security conditions, as outlined in the Secretary-General's reports (S/2010/447) and (S/2009/210);

5. *Recalling* the African Union's Chairperson's report of 13 September 2011 and the Secretary-General's report of 30 August 2011 (S/2011/549), *agrees* that an increase in United Nations organizations and their staff, and other official international visitors in Mogadishu is placing additional pressure on AMISOM to provide security, escort and protection services, *encourages* the United Nations to work with the African Union to develop a guard force of an appropriate size, within AMISOM's mandated troop levels, to provide security, escort and protection services to personnel from the international community, including the United Nations, and *expresses* its intention to review and consider thoroughly the possible need to adjust the mandated troop levels of AMISOM when the mission reaches its current mandated level of 12,000 troops;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the African Union in the planning and deployment of AMISOM, through the United Nations Office to the African Union, including on AMISOM Concept of Operations;

7. *Welcomes* the progress made by AMISOM in reducing civilian casualties during its operations, urges AMISOM to continue to undertake its efforts to prevent civilian casualties and to develop an effective approach to the protection of civilians as requested by the African Union Peace and Security Council;

8. *Requests* AMISOM to continue to assist the Transitional Federal Government in the development of the Somali Police Force and the National Security Force, in particular the implementation of an effective chain of command and control of the Somali Security Forces and to assist the integration of Somali units trained by other member States or organizations inside and outside Somalia;

9. *Noting* the important role an effective police presence can play in the stabilization of Mogadishu, *stresses* the need to continue to develop an effective Somali police force and *welcomes* the desire of the African Union to develop a police component within AMISOM;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM called for by resolution 1863 (2009) for a maximum of 12,000 AMISOM uniformed personnel, including the Guard Force referred to in paragraph 5 above, comprising equipment and services, including public information support, but not including the transfer of funds, as described in the Secretary-General's letter (S/2009/60) to the Security Council until 31 October 2012, ensuring the accountability and transparency of expenditure of United Nations funds as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1910 (2010);

11. *Decides* on an exceptional basis and due to the unique character of this mission, to extend the logistical support package for AMISOM for a maximum of 12,000 troops as described in the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General of 21 September 2011 (S/2011/591) and the President of the Security Council of 29 September 2011 (S/2011/602) whilst continuing to ensure maximum efficiency and engagement of relevant bilateral support;

12. *Considers* that counter-Improvised Explosive Device and explosive ordnance disposal activities, as described in the Secretary-General's letter (S/2009/60) to the Security Council, may be provided through the logistical support package, whilst continuing to ensure maximum efficiency and engagement of relevant bilateral support;

13. *Recalls* its statement of intent regarding the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation as expressed in resolution 1863 (2009), and *notes* that any decision to deploy such an operation would take into account inter alia the conditions set out in the Secretary-General's reports dated 16 April 2009 (S/2009/210) and 30 December 2010 (S/2010/675), and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the steps identified in paragraphs 82-86 of his report (S/2009/210), subject to the conditions in this report;

14. *Reiterates* its call to Member States and regional and international organizations to support AMISOM through the provision of equipment, technical assistance, and funding without caveats to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, or to make direct bilateral donations in support of AMISOM, including for the urgent need for the reimbursement of contingent owned equipment, and for the provision of compassionate flights for AMISOM troops, and *encourages* donors to work closely with the United Nations and African Union in order to ensure that the appropriate funds and equipment are promptly provided;

15. *Emphasizes* that in order to ensure Somalia's long-term security effective development of Somali Security Forces is needed, and *reiterates* its call to Member States, regional, and international organizations to contribute generously and promptly to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali security institutions, and to offer assistance to the Somali security forces, including through training, technical assistance and equipment in coordination with AMISOM, consistent with paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of resolution 1772 (2007);

16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to assist the Transitional Federal Government in developing the transitional security institutions, including

the Somali Police Force, and the National Security Force, and to continue to support the Transitional Federal Government in developing a Somali-owned national security strategy, which reflects respect for the rule of law and the protection of human rights, as well as the legal and policy framework for the operation of its security forces including governance, vetting and oversight mechanisms;

17. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) shall not apply to supplies and technical assistance provided in accordance with paragraph 11 (b) and 12 of resolution 1772 (2007) to the Transitional Federal Government for the purposes of the development of its security sector institutions, consistent with the Djibouti peace process and subject to the notification procedure set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1772 (2007);

18. *Reiterates* its call on all Somali parties to support the Djibouti Agreement, and calls for the end of all hostilities, acts of armed confrontation and efforts to undermine stability in Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government;

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative to continue to extend his good offices to facilitate reconciliation amongst all Somalis and the peace process in general, with the support of the international community, including, as appropriate, support to reconciliation and peace efforts at the local level;

20. *Notes* the important role regional administrations and civil society can play in the political process and encourages intensified dialogue and political outreach with these groups by the Transitional Federal Institutions;

21. *Encourages* the international community to provide, as part of the continuing support to Somalia, further support to peacebuilding, capacity-building and good governance efforts in areas of relative stability within Somalia, including but not limited to, Somaliland and Puntland;

22. *Condemns* all attacks against civilians in Somalia, *calls* for the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including sexual and gender based violence, or abuses committed against civilians, including women and children, and humanitarian personnel in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law and *stresses* the responsibility of all parties in Somalia to comply with their obligations to protect the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, in particular by avoiding any indiscriminate attacks or excessive use of force;

23. *Expresses* serious concern about the reports of continuing human rights violations in Somalia and *stresses* the importance to investigate these alleged human rights violations and to bring those responsible to justice;

24. *Recalls* the conclusions endorsed by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia (S/AC.51/2011/2), *calls* on all parties to end grave violations and abuses committed against children in Somalia, *urges* the Transitional Federal Government to develop and implement a concrete time-bound action plan to halt the recruitment and use of children, *requests* the Secretary-General to continue his dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government in this regard, and *reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General to strengthen the child protection component of UNPOS and to ensure continued monitoring and reporting of the situation of children in Somalia;

25. *Expresses* serious concern about increasing reports of conflict-related sexual violence in Somalia, *calls on* all parties to cease such violations and abuses, and *requests* the Secretary-General to implement the relevant provisions of resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010), including the strengthening of the women's protection component of UNPOS;

26. *Demands* all parties and armed groups to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and supplies, and *further demands* that all parties ensure full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance across Somalia;

27. *Requests* the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative for Somalia and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to redouble their efforts to coordinate effectively and develop an integrated approach to all activities of the United Nations system in Somalia, to provide good offices and political support for the efforts to establish lasting peace and stability in Somalia, and to mobilise resources and support from the international community for both the immediate recovery and long-term economic development of Somalia taking into account the recommendations contained in his report (S/2009/684), and *stresses* the importance that UNPOS and other United Nations offices and agencies work transparently and coordinate with the international community;

28. *Requests* the strengthening of cooperation among IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations to allow for an appropriate division of responsibilities in Somalia in an effort to reduce duplication of effort and ensure proper utilization of resources, and to include updates on this topic in the Secretary-General's regular reports on Somalia;

29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on all aspects of this resolution every four months and *expresses* its intention to review the situation, as part of his reporting obligations, as specified in the statement of the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30) and Security Council resolutions, 1863 (2009), 1872 (2009), 1910 (2010) and 1964 (2010);

30. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations A/66/387–S/2011/596

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
29 September 2011

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 35
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 29 September 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia in reaction to the State Duma's adoption of laws on the ratification of the agreements on the establishment of integrated military bases in Georgia's occupied territories, to the opinions expressed by the Russian Foreign Minister during a high-level meeting of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly on 27 September 2011 and to the presence of a Russian delegation, headed by the Chair of Russia's Federation Council, at the "inauguration" of the so-called "President of Abkhazia" (see annexes I, II and III).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

11-52632 (E) 041011

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Annex I to the identical letters dated 29 September 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Georgian Foreign Ministry in reaction to the State Duma's adoption of laws on the ratification of the agreements on the establishment of integrated military bases in Georgia's occupied territories

On 22 September 2011, the State Duma of the Russian Federation passed two laws: on the ratification of the so-called "Agreement on the establishment of an integrated Russian military base on the territory of the so-called 'Republic of Abkhazia'" (between the Russian Federation and the occupation regime it has created in Abkhazia); and on the ratification of the so-called "Agreement on the establishment of an integrated Russian military base on the territory of the so-called 'Republic of South Ossetia'" (between the Russian Federation and the occupation regime it has created in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia).

By having its legislative body formally approve such illegal and irresponsible actions, the Russian Federation is attempting to legitimize the establishment of Russian military bases on the sovereign territory of Georgia (without the consent of the Georgian Government) and is continuing its rapid militarization of Georgia's occupied territories in breach of the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The aforesaid is further proof that Russia — by illegally suspending its observance of the provisions of the Treaty — has created the preconditions for the uncontrolled expansion of its own military forces within the Treaty's area of application.

These extremely dangerous steps, which Russia has taken in breach of its international obligations and of universally recognized norms and principles of international law, are not only a serious threat to peace and stability in the Caucasus, Black Sea and Caspian regions but also to peace and stability in Europe as a whole.

Georgia condemns Russia's actions and calls upon the international community to influence the Russian Federation and to compel it to respect its international obligations and to immediately begin to withdraw its forces from Georgian territory.

Tbilisi, 22 September 2011

Annex II to the identical letters dated 29 September 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Georgian Foreign Ministry in reaction to the opinions expressed by the Russian Foreign Minister during a high-level meeting of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly on 27 September 2011

On 27 September 2011, in his speech to the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, once again tried to accuse Georgia of starting the hostilities of August 2008 and once again confirmed Moscow's readiness to be "a guarantor of arrangements regarding the non-use of force between Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia".

With such statements, Russia is continuing its hypocritical and self-righteous attempts to assure the international community that it is a peacekeeper and not a party to the conflict and that the Russian Government is therefore capable of guaranteeing peace and security in the region. In doing so, Moscow is once again trying to create an illusion whereby the occupation regimes it has created in Georgia's occupied territories should be considered as being subject to international law. Mr. Lavrov's statement also unequivocally indicates that the Russian Government is pursuing its attempts to establish so-called "lines of demarcation" and "exclusive spheres of influence" in Europe.

Since the day Georgia regained its independence, the Russian Federation has been continually and purposefully seeking to undermine Georgia's statehood, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and has regularly and blatantly been in breach of many fundamental principles and norms of international law. Russia cares nothing for bilateral and multilateral obligations, including provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August 2008.

It should be noted that the Georgian Government unilaterally expressed its willingness to abide by the principle of the non-use of force on 23 November 2010. Russia has not, however, responded in kind to date. The Russian Federation is obliged to renew the commitment it made — as part of the Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August 2008 — not to use force against Georgia, but the Russian Government will, however, not be able to escape from this obligation by making statements such as the one Mr. Lavrov recently made. A commitment to the principle of the non-use of force, the establishment of international mechanisms to ensure the security of Georgia's occupied territories and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes will be the main issues of the seventeenth round of the Geneva talks, to be held on 4 October 2011.

Mr. Lavrov's recent "peacekeeping" statement sounds particularly cynical when one considers the fact that Russia has deployed offensive forces in Georgia's occupied territories and that the Russian military is training these occupation troops, is rapidly building up stocks of armaments and is voicing a lot of military rhetoric. Everyone will no doubt remember the member of the Russian State Duma

Bagdasarov who spoke several days ago about the necessity of starting a war against Georgia before 2014.

Considering the above-mentioned facts, it is clear that the Russian Federation must — as soon as possible — renew its obligation under international law not to use force against Georgia. Only through such measures will Russia be able to slightly improve stability and security in the region.

Tbilisi, 28 September 2011

Annex III to the identical letters dated 29 September 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Georgian Foreign Ministry in reaction to the presence of a Russian delegation, headed by the Chair of Russia's Federation Council, at the "inauguration" of the so-called "President of Abkhazia"

On 26 September 2011, a Russian delegation, headed by the Chair of Russia's Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko, attended the "inauguration" of the so-called "President of Abkhazia" in Georgia's occupied region of Abkhazia.

It is no secret that the so-called "official visits" to the occupied territories of sovereign States of high-ranking Russian officials are nothing more than attempts to confer an illusion of legitimacy upon the regimes which the Russian Government itself has created in Georgia's occupied territories. Such "official visits" to the regions of Abkhazia or Tskhinvali obviously change nothing for these occupation regimes. To date, Russian efforts have resulted in turning Georgia's occupied regions into an enormous military base — a major source of destabilization for the Black Sea region and for Europe as a whole.

This recent visit of the newly elected and appointed Chair of the Russian Federation Council is an obvious breach of the Georgian Constitution and of commonly recognized norms and principles of international law, as well as a violation of the sovereignty of the Georgian State. The Russian Government has once again demonstrated that it cares nothing for international obligations, and that it never intended to and never will respect any of the provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August 2008.

The Georgian Foreign Ministry calls upon the international community to influence the Russian Federation and to compel it to respect its international obligations and to immediately begin to withdraw its forces from Georgian territory.

Tbilisi, 27 September 2011